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Abstract
Investors have become increasingly concerned about the cost of executive stock options to
shareholders. Because executives face hedging constraints, standard option theory does not apply.
The valuation problem reduces to accurately characterizing the option payoff. This paper develops
a methodology for estimating option exercise and cancellation rates as a function of the stock price
path, time to expiration, and firm and option holder characteristics. Our estimation accounts for
correlation between exercises by the same executive. Valuation proceeds by using the estimated
exercise rate function to describe the option’s expected payoff along each stock price path and
then computing the present value of the payoff. The estimation of empirical exercise rates also
allows us to test the predictions of theoretical models of option exercise behavior. The paper not
only illustrates an ideal valuation method for a large dataset, but also shows how to evaluate the
usefulness of some of the approximations proposed in the literature.
JEL classification: G14.
With the explosive growth of employee stock options in corporate compensation, in-
vestors, auditors, and regulators have become increasingly concerned about the cost of these
options to shareholders. Recent regulation requiring firms to recognize option cost has inten-
sified the demand for suitable valuation methods. The difficulty is that these are long-lived
American options, so their value depends crucially on how employees exercise them. Yet,
because employees face hedging constraints, standard option theory does not apply. For
example, contrary to the predictions of standard theory, the vast majority of options on
non-dividend paying stock are exercised well before expiration because option holders can-
not sell the options, and this significantly reduces their present value.
In standard theory for an ordinary American call, the holder can sell the option at any
time, so it is reasonable to assume that he times the option exercise in order to maximize the
option’s present value. The present value-maximizing exercise policy and its implications for
option value are well-researched (see for example, Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973),
or Kim (1990)).
By contrast, the holder of an executive stock option must bear the risk of the option
payoff, so simply maximizing the option’s present value is generally not optimal. Indeed,
evidence indicates that executives systematically exercise options on non-dividend paying
stocks well before expiration. These early exercises significantly reduce option value.
In principle, as long as the exercise decision generates an option payoff that is subject
only to hedgeable risks, such as stock price risk, and diversifiable risks, such as uncertainties
that are idiosyncratic across executives, then unconstrained market participants can replicate
those payoffs and so pricing by no arbitrage is still possible. The option valuation problem
then reduces to accurately characterizing the option payoffs, that is, the exercise policies of
executives.
One approach that has been taken in the literature is to model the exercise decision the-
oretically. The executive presumably chooses an option exercise policy as part of a greater
utility maximization problem that includes other decisions, such as portfolio and consump-
tion choice and managerial strategy. The utility-maximizing exercise policy may call for
early exercise for diversification purposes or forfeiture if employment terminates when the
option is unvested or out of the money. Properly valuing the option from the viewpoint
of shareholders requires taking these possibilities into account. Papers that develop utility-
maximizing models and then calculate the implied cost of options to shareholders include
Huddart (1994), Carpenter (1998), Detemple and Sundaresan (1999), Ingersoll (2006), and
Carpenter et al. (2005). Another approach is to estimate the exercise policy empirically. Pa-
pers such as Carpenter (1998) and Bettis et al. (2005) calibrate utility-maximizing models
to mean exercise times and stock prices in the data, and then infer option value. However,
these paper provide no formal estimation and the approach relies on the validity of the
utility-maximizing models used. Huddart and Lang (1996) and Heath et al. (1999) provide
more flexible empirical descriptions of option exercise patterns but do not go as far as option
valuation.
This paper develops a methodology for formally estimating option exercise and cancel-
lation rates as a function of the underlying stock price path, time remaining to expiration,
and firm and option holder characteristics, using a sample of CEO and top executive option
exercises from 100 firms from 1990 to 2002. Theory suggests that, in addition to stock return
volatility and dividend rate, variables such as executive wealth, risk aversion, and holdings
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of restricted stock and other options should affect exercise decisions. Our hand-constructed
database carefully tracks executive stock and option grants, exercises, and salary to provide
information about portfolio position and wealth over time. We will distinguish hedgeable
stock price risk from unhedgeable stock price risk because they may have different effects on
the executive’s exercise decision. We will also examine the explanatory power of psycholog-
ical variables such as functions of the stock price path that have been found significant in
Heath et al. (1999).
Valuation of an option with a given set of characteristics proceeds by using the estimated
hazard function to describe the option’s expected payoff along each stock price path and
then computing the present value of the payoff, that is, its risk-neutral expected discounted
payoff, in the usual way. This approach is similar to the prepayment modeling and valuation
methods developed for mortgage-backed securities (see, for example, Schwartz and Torous
(1989), and Stanton (1995)).
The estimation of empirical exercise rates also allows us to test the predictions of the-
oretical models of option exercise behavior. For example, do larger holdings of restricted
stock speed exercise? We can also weigh in on open questions such as whether increased
stock volatility speeds or delays exercise and how that affects option value.
Our valuation method works best with large samples that include a wide variety of stock
price paths. The Society of Actuaries has established a task force on executive stock options
to begin collecting data on exercises at thousands of firms. Once the data are in place, an
actuarial science for valuing compensatory stock options can develop, similar to that for
pension liabilities. Our paper develops a valuation methodology that would be ideal for such
a dataset.
A number of analytic methods for approximating executive stock option value have been
proposed in the literature. The FASB currently permits using the Black-Scholes formula with
the expiration date replaced by the option’s expected life. Jennergren and Na¨slund (1993),
Carr and Linetsky (2000)), and Cvitanic´ et al. (2004) derive analytic formulas for option
value assuming exogenously specified exercise boundaries and hazard rates. Hull and White
(2004) propose a model in which exercise occurs when the stock price reaches an exogenously
specified multiple of the stock price and forfeiture occurs at an exogenous rate. Until the
accuracy of these methods can be determined, the usefulness of these methods cannot be
assessed. Our estimated exercise rate function not only permits us to deduce the correct
option value, but also allows us to estimate the parameters, such as the option’s expected
life, we need to carry out a given approximation method. In this way, our paper not only
illustrates an ideal valuation method for a large dataset, but also shows how to evaluate the
usefulness of some of the shortcuts proposed in the literature.
1 Option Cost to the Firm
To motivate the importance of estimating exercise rates from data, we first describe their
role in option valuation. Standard American option theory assumes the option holder can
trade or hedge the option, so his exercise policy is to maximize the option’s present value.
Employee stock option holders can neither sell their options nor short sell the stock, so
in order to monetize the value of the option they may be forced to exercise it in a value-
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destroying way. For example, the vast majority of options on non-dividend paying stocks are
exercised early. These early exercises may arise because the option holder needs liquidity or
diversification away from stock price risk. In addition, the holder might be forced to exercise
or forfeit the option if he leaves the firm. Accurate valuation of employee stock options must
take the possibility of these early exercises and forfeitures into account.
Recent theoretical models of employee stock options derive the exercise policy as the
solution to the employee’s utility maximization in the presence of departure risk and con-
straints on sales of options and stock. These models are useful for predicting which variables
are likely to affect exercise decisions and for illustrating implications for option cost, but
these models are likely to be too simplified and inflexible to describe adequately the actual
exercise patterns observed in the data.
If enough data are available, a better approach is to estimate the exercise policy, i.e.,
the option payoff, directly from data on option outcomes. To allow for decisions that may
depend on more than just the stock price, we describe the exercise policy in terms of a hazard
function that describes the conditional probability of option exercise or forfeiture at each
time and state, and then estimate the hazard function from the data. The hazard function
could accurately describe utility-maximizing policies, if those are generating the data. But
it also allows for the possibility of more general forms of exercise behavior. The hazard
function could depend not only on the stock price path and time remaining to expiration,
but also on any other variables that affect the probability of an option exercise. These could
include characteristics of the firm, such as its volatility, and characteristics of the option
holder, such as wealth and portfolio holdings.
For an individual option, the hazard function describes the probability that the option
is exercised at a given time and state, conditional on having survived to that point. If the
event that the option is actually exercised is sufficiently independent across option holders
with identical hazard functions, conditional on the given time and state, then in a large
enough pool of such option holders, the hazard function describes the fraction of options
remaining in the pool that actually exercise at that time and state. We assume that such
diversification is possible, or, more generally, that the conditional variance in the number of
options actually exercised or forfeited around the expected value is not a priced risk in the
market, so that option valuation proceeds as if perfect diversification were possible.
For each possible stock price path, we use the hazard function to calculate the fraction of
remaining options that get exercised at each point along that path in a hypothetical pool of
identical options. In this way, the hazard function generates a stream of cash flows from the
pool along every stock price path. The present value of these cash flows can be represented
as their expected discounted payoff, using so-called “risk-neutral probabilities” to average
across stock price paths. This present value, or replication cost, is the cost of the option to
the firm.
Various methods for approximating option value have been proposed in the literature.
One approximation method currently permitted by the FASB is to compute the Black Scholes
value of the option using the option’s expected life in place of its maturity. Our estimated
hazard function can be used to compute option expected life, and thus the option’s FASB
value. We could then compare this with the correct option value and evaluate the usefulness
of this approximation.
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2 Data
Our data cover option grants, exercises, and terminations for the top five executives at
106 high technology firms. These include option grant dates, vesting periods, strike prices,
exercise dates, executive names and rank. We also track the executives’ salary, bonus, and
holdings of restricted stock. The sample firms are all those listed in Hoover’s Guide to
Computer Companies 1995 that were publicly traded in the US and operated primarily
in the computer industry. Using annual proxy statements, we compile the history of the
contractual structure of the executive compensation packages as far back as 1992 and as
far forward as 2003. We get the data on option exercises from the SEC’s Transactions and
Holdings Information, which includes Form 4: Statement of Changes of Beneficial Ownership
of Securities and Form 5: Annual Statement of Beneficial Ownership of Securities. These
documents are obtained from Lancer Analytics, a subsidiary of Thompson Financial. Data
on termination is also available from Hoover’s. Tables 1 through 14 and Figures 1 through
7 describe the data on CEO salary and option grants and exercises from 1992 to 2002.
2.1 Illustrative Data Analysis for Selected High Tech Firms
We use two additional data sets to illustrate the applicability of fractional logit estimators
for modeling ESO exercise transitions at daily frequencies.1 The first data set includes the
employee stock option grants and option exercise histories for all employees that work for
a large publicly traded semiconductor firm, Semiconductor Firm A. The data set includes
55,523 ESO grants to about seventy five hundred employees over the period 1982 through
2005. About 83% of Semiconductor Firm A’s ESOs were granted in 1997 (24.89% of total),
2000 (35.3% of total), and 2004 (23.2% of total). In all three of these years, the vesting
structure is twenty five percent per year over four years and the option maturities are six
years. There were no recorded exercises of options granted later than 1998, and about 96%
of the employee exercise events involved the exercise of 1997 grants. For that reason, our
illustrative discussion will focus on the 14,506 option exercise experiences of 1997 ESO grants
that Semiconductor Firm A made to its employees.
We supplement the ESO performance data from Semiconductor Firm A with a data set
developed by the authors that includes the option grants and exercise histories for 100 CEOs
in the high technology computer industry (semiconductor, computer, and software/services
firms) over the period 1992 through 2004 (about 1,600 grants). These data allow us to
focus on the option exercise dynamics of large option positions and to contrast these with
the performance of the smaller grants that appear in Semiconductor A data. The average
number of options granted per grant was 4,058 in the data from Semiconductor Firm A,
whereas, in the high tech CEO data, the average number of options granted per grant was
287,753.
We merge each grant to an appropriate path of stock prices and stock splits using the
initial granting date, the vesting structure and the ESO’s maturity. This merge generates
a panel data set of daily time varying covariates for each grant. These covariates include
the split-adjusted stock prices, exercise prices, outstanding vested options, and alternative
1We thank Terrence Adamson at AON Consulting for these data.
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termination events (due to death, retirement, and separations among others). Our unit
of analysis is the fraction of each grant exercised by each employee each period and our
period is defined as a stock trading day. The resulting data sets are quite large.2 We provide
summary statistics for these grant-level panels in Tables 1 through 3 and Figures 1 though 8.
The primary objective of these summaries is to illustrate the time series and cross-sectional
structure of ESO performance data and to highlight the superiority of the fractional logit
class of estimators over the more standard logit and proportional hazard estimators.
In Figures 1 and 2, we graph the experience paths for two different employees who received
relatively small ESO grants from Semiconductor Firm A on October 27, 1997. As shown
in Figure 1 and 2, the stock price and strike price paths are the same given the common
grant date. The exercise experience and the consequent dynamics of the options outstanding
are quite different for the two employees. The average fraction of vested options that were
exercised by the employee shown in Figure 1 is 56%, whereas, as reported in Figure 2, the
average fraction of vested options that were exercised in each of the five exercise events by the
second employee is 71%. The employees also differ in average number of options exercised and
the time elapsed between the first vesting period and the option exercise event. The Figure
1 employee always has vested options outstanding after the first vest through the last full
exercise, however, Figure 2 employee frequently fully exercises each block of vested options
and then uses fractional exercises of the outstanding stock later in the holding period. These
different patterns of fractional exercise behavior and the path persistence of the behavior
cannot be successfully handled in either a logit or proportional hazard framework, but they
are estimable in a fractional logit framework.
Tables 1 through 3 summarize the exercise experience of all the exercised option grants
for about 6,879 employees at Semiconductor Firm A. As reported in Table 1, the average
run-up in the ratio of the stock price to the strike price was slightly more that 300%, although
for employees that exercised at the height of the stock market peak the maximal increase
was 1,304%. The average number of days from first vest was 958.78 and the percentage of
vested options that were exercised in any one exercise event was 91%. The average number
of options exercised was 2,361 at each exercise and the maximal is 1.6 million options.
Table 2 presents a summary of the time series of exercise events for the 1997 option
grants awarded by Semiconductor Firm A. The average cumulative change in the price to
strike ratio rises to a high as expected in 2000 at the stock market peak and then the ratio
decreases. The average percentage of vested options exercised ranges from a high of 98% per
exercise experience in 1998 and to a low of 89% per exercise experience in 2000 when most
option holdings were fully exercised at each event.
In Table 3, we compare the characteristics of exercise events for large blocks of options
to those for small blocks of options. We expect that the larger grants belong to senior
managers, however, this expectation is not possible to verify because we lack information
on individual employment status. In the upper panel of Table 3, we report the performance
characteristics for ESO exercises of greater than 10,000 options and, in the lower panel, we
report the characteristics of ESO exercises involving fewer than 1,000 options. We find that
exercise of large block of options is usually not complete and ranges from 68% to 87% of the
2The are over twelve million records generated for the Semiconductor Firm A data and over five million
records for the CEO data
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vested holdings. The exercise of smaller blocks of vested options is usually associated with
the full exercise of the outstanding stock of options and the percentages range from 79% to
99%. It is interesting to note that the highest exercise percentages are not associated with
the 2000 stock price run-up.
These summary data indicate apparent differences in the exercise behavior of employees
with large option holdings and employees that do not have such holdings. In addition,
fractional exercise of vested options is a common feature of large exercise events. Since logit
and hazard estimators do not control for the size of transition events these important features
of ESO exercise decisions would be inaccurately modeled. The fractional logit specification,
however, properly controls the relative fraction of the exercise events and the effects of
important time varying covariates on the level of these exercises.
In Figure 3 and 4, we plot the ESO exercise experience for the CEO of Semiconductor
Firm A. As shown, although the CEO has a large option position, he always exercises 100%
of the outstanding vested shares when he exercises. Interestingly, the CEO appears highly
time series consistent in his exercise decisions and exercises at about the same period in the
option’s life. A contrasting picture of a CEO’s exercise strategy is plotted in Figure 5 and 6
for another semiconductor firm: Semiconductor Firm B. This CEO again exhibits time series
consistent ESO exercise strategies and he prefers to initially exercise a small fraction of his
vested options and then wait to fully exercise the remainder after about three years. Finally,
in Figure 7 and 8, we present a more extreme form of fractional exercise by the CEO of a
large publicly traded software firm: Software Firm. This CEO exercises small percentages
of his total vested options toward the end of the ESO holding period. These exercises are
substantially less than one in all but the last exercise which is 100%.
To conclude, our summaries of large panels of cross sections of ESO performance histories
indicates that there is important heterogeneity in the exercise strategies of employees. Frac-
tional exercises of vested option holdings is quite common among employees that are CEOs
and for large option holders. The CEO of Semiconductor Firm A is somewhat outside this
general conclusion, although he does exhibit strong time series consistency in his pattern of
exercises before the option expiration date. In contrast, smaller vested option positions tend
to wholly exercise. These findings strongly support the use of an estimator that controls for
fractional exercise while explicitly handling the correlation between option exercises within
and between different grants held by the same employee. The fractional logit estimator is
suitable for cross sections of panel data, such as our grant-day performance data for ESOs,
and allows for fixed effects for employees and controls for time series persistence. Neither of
the standard alternative estimators, such as logit or proportional hazard models, allow for
partial or fractional transitions.
3 Specification and Estimation of Exercise Behavior
As discussed above, we need to estimate the hazard rate governing the likelihood of a given
option’s being exercised at any given time and state. There is a large literature on hazard
rates and their estimation, but primarily in settings where the occurrence of the event being
modeled is uncorrelated across different individuals, once dependence on a set of underlying
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covariates has been taken into account.3 This is very different from the setting we face.
As is clear from Figures 1–8, the exercise of one option in a given grant held by an
individual is extremely highly correlated with the exercise of another option in the same
grant held by the same individual. It is also highly (though less so) correlated with the
exercise of options in other grants held by the same individual. Using standard econometric
techniques to estimate hazard rates based on exercise at the individual option level would
result in very misleading results. It would treat each option as an independent observation
(thus adding new information to the estimation), whereas in fact each individual option is so
highly correlated with other options that, by itself, it adds almost no additional information.
As a result, the estimation would report wildly optimistic confidence intervals, suggesting a
much more precise knowledge of the true hazard rate than we actually have.
This issue does arise in other settings, such as in modeling corporate bond default, where
it has been observed that defaults cluster more than a pure hazard rate story would suggest.
This implies that, after controlling for the hazard rate, the event of default is correlated
across firms. One popular solution, when the number of firms involved is small, has been to
use “copula functions”, which explicitly model this correlation.4 However, this is not feasible
in our case, since the number of options (and hence the number of correlation coefficients to
consider) is too high.
Instead of looking at individual options, we directly model the fraction of each grant
exercised each period. Other authors have previously looked at fractions of grants exercised,
including Heath et al. (1999), who regress the fraction of each grant exercised against various
explanatory variables. However, this simple regression approach has several problems. First,
it does not force the expected proportion of options exercised in a given month to be between
zero and one, which causes problems when we try to use the parameters for valuation.
Second, aggregating exercises across different individuals throws away a lot of potentially
important information about the differences in exercise behavior across individuals.
In this paper, we model the fraction of each grant exercised by each holder each period,
in a manner that allows us to obtain hazard rates that must be positive, while explicitly
handling the correlation between option exercises within and between different grants held
by the same individual.
3.1 The covariates
Even a parsimonious description of the exercise rate must allow for dependence on the level
of the stock price and the time to expiration, since these variables determine whether or not
the option is vested or in the money. A richer description of the hazard function would also
allow the hazard rate to depend on other variables that theory predicts would be important,
such as the wealth of the option holder and his holdings of other options and restricted stock,
as well as the volatility of the underlying stock price and portion of risk that is hedgeable
using other assets. It might also be of interest to include executive rank as an explanatory
variable.
One of the most difficult problems is how to describe the portfolio of the option holder.
3For good introductions to hazard rate analysis, see Cox (1972) or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).
4See, for example, Li (2001).
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One issue is that theory would suggest that total wealth is what matters but only data on
compensation is available. Salary may be a reasonable proxy for wealth. A more complicated
problem is summarizing the stock and option holdings of the executive. Formal theory of
optimal exercise of multiple executive stock option grants has not yet developed. Intuition
suggests that the greater the option holder’s total forced exposure to the stock risk, the
greater the exercise rate. This might be measured as the dollar variance of total or unhedge-
able stock risk represented by the stock and option positions, using Black-Scholes option
deltas to quantify the size of those positions.
Another variable of importance is a measure of the attractiveness of exercising the given
option in question. Some candidates include the market-to-strike-price ratio or the Heath
et al. (1999) ratio of option exercise value to option value under a standard model. Heath
et al. (1999) also find that so-called psychological variables such as recent lagged stock returns
and stock price relative to its maximum have predictive power.
Estimation of a hazard function that depends on option holder characteristics such as
portfolio holdings would allow for tests of theory about optimal executive stock option ex-
ercise. However, estimation with a dataset that only includes exercise data would require a
more parsimonious specification of the hazard function that would depend only on the stock
price process. In the more parsimonious specification, variation in the characteristics of the
option holders is essentially treated as another diversifiable risk that can be priced at its
expected value. In any case, we can use the estimation to address important open questions
such as how stock return volatility affects exercise rates and option value.
3.2 Estimating the Model
This section describes the details of our estimation procedure, which is based on the fractional
logistic approach of Papke and Wooldridge (1996). Let yijt be the fraction exercised at time
t of grant j held by individual i, and assume that we can write
yijt = G(Xijtβ) + ijt, (1)
where Xt is some set of covariates in It, the information set at date t, where G, the expected
fraction exercised at date t, is a function satisfying 0 < G(z) < 1, and where
E(ijt | It) = 0,
E(ijt i′j′t′) = 0 if i 6= i′ or t 6= t′.
In application, we’ll use the logistic function,
G(Xijtβ) =
exp(Xijtβ)
1 + exp(Xijtβ)
.
Note that, unlike a linear specification, the predicted fraction exercised each period must
always be between 0 and 1. Note also that, while we are assuming the residuals ijt are
uncorrelated between individuals and across time periods, we are allowing for ijt to be
arbitrarily correlated between different grants held by the same individual at a given point
in time, and we are not making any further assumptions about the exact distribution of ijt,
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or even about its variance.5
As in Papke and Wooldridge (1996), we estimate the parameter vector β using quasi-
maximum likelihood (see Gourie´roux et al. (1984)) with the Bernoulli log-likelihood function,
lijt(β) = yijt log [G(Xijtβ)] + (1− yijt) log [1−G(Xijtβ)] . (2)
Estimation involves solving
max
β
∑
i,j,t
lijt(β).
The K first order conditions, corresponding to the K elements of β, are given by∑
i,j,t
dlijt(β)
dβ
=
∑
i,j,t
Xijt
[
G′(Xijtβ)
(
yijt
G(Xijtβ)
− 1− yijt
1−G(Xijtβ)
)]
=
∑
i,j,t
(
XijtG
′(Xijtβ)
G(Xijtβ)(1−G(Xijtβ))
)
(yijt −G(Xijtβ)) , (3)
= 0.
Equation (1) implies (using iterated expectations) that the population expectation of these
first order conditions is zero, hence this QML estimator, β̂, is a (consistent) GMM estimator
of β, with no assumptions other than Equation (1). Following the notation in Papke and
Wooldridge (1996), define the residual
ûijt ≡ yijt −G(Xijtβ̂),
and define
Ĝijt ≡ G(Xijtβ̂),
≡ ŷijt,
ĝijt ≡ G′(Xijtβ̂).
With uncorrelated residuals, the asymptotic covariance matrix of β̂ takes the usual “sand-
wich” form (see Gourie´roux et al. (1984)),
Â
−1
B̂Â−1,
5In particular, unlike assuming (say) a beta distribution for yijt (see, for example, Mullahy (1990) or
Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004)), we are allowing for a positive probability that yijt takes on the extreme
values zero and one.
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where
Â =
∑
i,j,t
∂2lijt(β̂)
∂β∂β′
=
∑
i,j,t
ĝ2ijtXijtX
′
ijt
Ĝijt(1− Ĝijt)
, (4)
B̂ =
∑
i,j,t
(
∂lijt(β̂)
∂β
)(
∂lijt(β̂)
∂β′
)
=
∑
i,j,t
û2ijtĝ
2
ijtXijtX
′
ijt[
Ĝijt(1− Ĝijt)
]2 . (5)
If we allow for correlation between the residuals, assuming that
var(u) = Ω =

Σ1 . . . 0
. . .
... Σi
...
. . .
0 . . . ΣI
 ,
where each Σ block corresponds to all of the option grants held by a given individual on a
particular date, then B̂ takes the slightly more complex form
B̂ = Ŝ =
(
ĝ
Ĝ(1− Ĝ) ⊗X
)′
Ω̂
(
ĝ
Ĝ(1− Ĝ) ⊗X
)
,
where ĝ/[Ĝ(1 − Ĝ)] is a vector containing the stacked values of ĝijt/[Ĝijt(1 − Ĝijt)], X is a
matrix containing all of the stacked Xijt values,
Ω̂ =

Σ̂1 . . . 0
. . .
... Σ̂i
...
. . .
0 . . . Σ̂I

and
Σ̂i = ûiû
′
i.
This covariance matrix (which reduces to Equation (5) if Ω is diagonal) is robust both to
arbitrary heteroscedasticity and to arbitrary correlation between the residuals in a given
block. For further discussion of calculating standard errors in the presence of clustering, see
Rogers (1993), Baum et al. (2003), Wooldridge (2003) and Petersen (2005).
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4 Evaluating Alternative Valuation Methods
A number of simpler valuation methods that yield analytic expressions for option value have
been proposed in the literature. For example, the FASB allows firms to value options at
their Black-Scholes value using the option’s expected life as the expiration date. Hull and
White (2004) propose a model in which the option is exercised once the stock price rises
above a prespecified multiple of the strike price.
We can also use the estimated hazard function to determine the option’s expected life and
then compute the FASB approximation for executive stock option value. Similarly, we can
use the estimated hazard function to determine the expected level of the stock price multiple
at exercise and then compute the option’s Hull and White value. We can then compare these
to the correct option value and evaluate the usefulness of these approximations.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a methodology for estimating option exercise and cancellation rates as
a function of the stock price path, time to expiration, and firm and option holder character-
istics. Our estimation is based on a fractional logit approach and accounts for correlation
between exercises by the same executive. Valuation proceeds by using the estimated exercise
rate function to describe the option’s expected payoff along each stock price path and then
computing the present value of the payoff. The estimation of empirical exercise rates also
allows us to test the predictions of theoretical models of option exercise behavior. The paper
not only illustrates an ideal valuation method for a large dataset, but also shows how to
evaluate the usefulness of some of the approximations proposed in the literature. Finally,
the paper describes our sample of option exercises for the top five executives at 106 firms.
We will apply this methodology using our sample of option exercises in future work.
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Table 1: Semiconductor Firm A: Summary Statistics for Employee Option Exercise Experi-
ences
This table provides summary statistics for 14,506 option exercise experiences for options granted in 1997 to
6,879 employees in a large publicly traded semiconductor firm.
Mean Standard Dev. Maximum Minimum
Cumulative change in stock price/strike price 3.04 1.14 13.04 1.03
Number of days since first vest 958.78 631.21 2216.00 15.00
Percent of vested options exercised 0.91 0.21 1.00 .01
Options exercised 2361.48 21,175.55 1,600,000.00 4.00
Stock Price/Strike Price 3.04 1.14 10.04 1.03
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Table 2: Semiconductor Firm A: Summary Statistics for Employee Option Exercise Experi-
ences by Year of Exercise
This table provides summary statistics for 14,506 option exercise events for options granted in 1997 to 6,879
employees in a large publicly traded semiconductor firm. The exercise experiences are summarized for the
year in which the options were exercised.
Mean Standard Dev. Maximum Minimum Exercise Experiences
Cumulative change in stock price/strike price
1998 1.39 0.13 1.96 1.03 218
1999 2.80 0.73 4.99 1.16 4334
2000 4.97 1.29 13.03 1.53 2268
2001 2.95 0.44 5.45 1.54 2973
2002 2.78 0.59 4.83 1.32 1524
2003 2.31 0.52 4.85 1.09 1574
2004 2.36 0.39 4.33 1.27 1615
Number of days since first vest
1998 77.82 46.18 295.00 15.00 218
1999 319.45 120.96 700.00 94.00 4334
2000 589.15 117.72 991.00 458.00 2268
2001 1012.61 121.49 1400.00 823.00 2973
2002 1314.12 112.50 1760.00 1188.00 1524
2003 1738.02 114.16 2128.00 1553.00 1574
2004 2121.37 89.01 2216.00 1918.00 1615
Percent of vested options exercised
1998 0.98 0.10 1.00 0.18 218
1999 0.93 0.18 1.00 0.07 4334
2000 0.89 0.23 1.00 0.01 2268
2001 0.90 0.22 1.00 0.03 2973
2002 0.90 0.23 1.00 0.01 1524
2003 0.92 0.21 1.00 0.01 1574
2004 0.91 0.22 1.00 0.01 1615
Options exercised
1998 1289.74 4331.76 40000.00 128.00 218
1999 590.57 3573.27 100000.00 16.00 4334
2000 1503.72 9558.97 259600.00 8.00 2268
2001 1317.29 7665.33 288000.00 20.00 2973
2002 2785.44 18156.44 480000.00 40.00 1524
2003 6050.03 35798.28 1120000.00 4.00 1574
2004 6390.33 46423.38 1600000.00 40.00 1615
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Table 3: Semiconductor Firm A: Comparison of the Percentage of Vested Options that are
Exercised When the Number of Options Exercised is Large (Greater than 10,000 options
exercised) and When the Number of Options Exercised is Small (Less than 1,000 options
exercised) and for Exercise Events by Year of Exercise
This table provides a comparison of the percentage of vested options that are exercised when the number of
options that are exercised is large and when the number that are exercised is small. The exercise experiences
are summarized for the year in which the options were exercised.
Mean Standard Dev. Maximum Minimum Exercise Experiences
Exercise Events when the Number of Options that are Exercised is ≥ 10,000
Cumulative change in stock price/strike price
1998 1.61 0.18 1.89 1.42 32
1999 2.58 0.86 4.91 1.21 134
2000 5.86 2.27 10.04 1.53 268
2001 2.99 0.96 4.95 1.54 725
2002 2.81 0.82 4.65 1.32 673
2003 2.48 0.91 4.34 1.09 1268
2004 2.23 0.94 4.33 1.27 1369
Percent of vested options exercised
1998 0.68 0.43 1.00 0.18 5
1999 0.80 0.28 1.00 0.15 47
2000 0.75 0.34 1.00 0.06 48
2001 0.87 0.26 1.00 0.07 47
2002 0.79 0.32 1.00 0.04 41
2003 0.68 0.38 1.00 0.08 84
2004 0.72 0.33 1.00 0.09 94
Exercise Events when the Number of Options that are Exercised ≤ 1,000
Cumulative change in stock price/strike price
1998 1.38 0.10 1.96 1.17 186
1999 2.50 0.71 4.68 1.32 4201
2000 4.95 1.81 8.85 2.28 2000
2001 2.94 0.40 5.45 1.77 2260
2002 2.94 0.46 3.58 1.34 850
2003 2.38 0.48 3.30 1.55 310
2004 2.41 0.34 3.18 2.01 256
Percent of vested options exercised
1998 0.99 0.07 1.00 0.22 186
1999 0.93 0.17 1.00 0.07 4201
2000 0.90 0.22 1.00 0.02 2000
2001 0.88 0.24 1.00 0.03 2260
2002 0.86 0.25 1.00 0.03 850
2003 0.84 0.29 1.00 0.03 310
2004 0.79 0.31 1.00 0.01 256
16
Figure 1: Fractional Exercise Experience for a Small Option Grant
The figure illustrates stock price dynamics, vesting structure, strike price dynamics, and option exercise
events for a small option grant. The employee received the option grant in 1997 and the firm is a large
semi-conductor company. 
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Figure 2: Semiconductor Company A: Fractional Exercise Experience for a Small Option
Grant
The figure illustrates stock price dynamics, vesting structure, strike price dynamics, and option exercise
events for a small option grant. The employee received the option grant in 1997 and the firm is a large
publicly semi-conductor company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0 147
290
436
582
724
870
1015
1158
1304
1453
1600
1745
1890
2034
2179
2326
2472
Days from Grant
O
pt
io
ns
0
50
100
150
200
250
Pr
ic
e
Vested Shares Shares Exercised Strike Price
 
18
Figure 3: Semiconductor Company A: Exercise Experience for a Large Option Grant to the
CEO
The figure illustrates stock price dynamics, vesting structure, strike price dynamics, and option exercise
events for a large option grant. The employee is the CEO of a large publicly traded semiconductor company
and the options were granted in 1996. 
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Figure 4: Semiconductor Company A: Exercise Experience for a Large Option Grant to the
CEO
The figure illustrates stock price dynamics, vesting structure, strike price dynamics, and option exercise
events for a large option grant. The employee is the CEO of a large publicly traded semiconductor company
and the options were granted in 1998. 
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Figure 5: Semiconductor Company B: Exercise Experience for a Large Option Grant to the
CEO
The figure illustrates stock price dynamics, vesting structure, strike price dynamics, and option exercise
events for a large option grant. The employee is the CEO of a large publicly traded semiconductor company
and the options were granted in September, 1998. 
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Figure 6: Semiconductor Company B: Exercise Experience for a Large Option Grant to the
CEO
The figure illustrates stock price dynamics, vesting structure, strike price dynamics, and option exercise
events for a large option grant. The employee is the CEO of a large publicly traded semiconductor company
and the options were granted in July, 1998. 
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Figure 7: Software Company: Exercise Experience for a Large Option Grant to the CEO
The figure illustrates stock price dynamics, vesting structure, strike price dynamics, and option exercise
events for a large option grant. The employee is the CEO of a large publicly traded software company and
the options were granted in 1996. 
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Figure 8: Software Company: Exercise Experience for a Large Option Grant to the CEO
The figure illustrates stock price dynamics, vesting structure, strike price dynamics, and option exercise
events for a large option grant. The employee is the CEO of a large publicly traded software company and
the options were granted in 1996. 
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